Drastic changes to the domain security methodology
Today’s domain security status is marked by several issues that affirm the system’s weaknesses – along with the observation that the underlying managing forces do not wish any such change to occur.
Very simple methods of domain security are being neglected or even avoided. Registrars should lock domains by default and make it harder to remove the lock. An experimental layer of domain locking at Registry level should be provisioned with less bureaucratic delay and more regard to the dozens of domains that are being hijacked daily. Very few make it to the news.
There are plenty of reasons why domain names should be treated like real estate titles and their ownership recorded, tracked and secured. It might sound revolutionary and extreme, however I believe that a Registrar should offer the option of a physical, bank-like vault that would give ultimate access to its owner in the event of an account change of ownership.
I exchanged a few emails with domainer and investor George Kirikos who has some interesting suggestions to make, and I quote:
It should be like a land registry, and we should *own* the domain completely (with no expiry), with perhaps an annual fee for the domain resolution aspect (i.e. if the domain name has nameservers, you pay a little each year; but, if you fail to pay that annual fee, you still own the name, it never expires, but it just fails to resolve).
Despite the sheer numbers, it is clear that the end-users, owners, domainers and entrepreneurs involved in the domain industry are currently given a secondary role in ensuring the security of their own assets, property and livelihood.
It would probably take an extreme case that’d make it into the known political circles of Washington, in order for such a drastic change to occur. Until then, keep your domains locked and use only reputable registrars to keep them safe.
